Breaking Through Intelligence Silos for Domestic Emergency Management

Introduction

While there are gaps in the United States between law enforcement and emergency management on intelligence and information sharing, those gaps also extend to other members of the intelligence community (IC). This includes U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) groupings and non-DoD military groups such as the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)—especially as they relate to the DoD’s support to civilian authorities.

Past headlines have shown the adverse impacts from the disconnects on intelligence sharing between solo—and siloed—law enforcement entities and other groups, including federal law enforcement entities. Per U.S. Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-8 [1], intelligence and investigation roles [2] at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) are limited to law enforcement-driven interdiction and investigation and do not flow across all five mission areas (see Figure 1) in all threats/hazards [3]. Because of this, those roles are only defined in the prevention and protection mission areas in the figure.

Even internally within divergent law enforcement entities on a law enforcement-centric incident response, these “failures to share intelligence” can have adverse impacts on life safety, such as the tragedy at the Robb Elementary School in Uvalde, TX [4]. Compounding this intelligence-siloing problem, when U.S. military elements (whether federalized or state/territory controlled) are introduced for civilian support, there is not a clear set of processes and procedures in the United States to utilize and share actionable intelligence to benefit emergency management in support of that response.

The solution is to shift the roles for and concept of intelligence from a law-enforcement/terrorism view to one applicable to a broader set of needs for overall emergency management while still preserving and protecting the civil liberties and privacy rights of U.S. citizens [5]. Thus, the introduction of a concept of the overarching collection of curated emergency management intelligence (EMINT) elements applies to civilian-led incident operations. Through a comprehensive review of the plans, organizations (and staff roles), equipment and systems, training, and joint exercises between military and civilian emergency management groupings, EMINT can be applied. It is through emergency management principles and actions that the unified command and control—the unity of effort—can be achieved through coordination, collaboration, cooperation, and communication. This was lacking on 9/11 [6] (and most likely before that) and continues even now.

This article focuses on the domestic emergency management adverse impacts of the silos for intelligence curation and distribution within the United States at the federal level. It covers the various federalized DoD military groupings to include the USCG and the National Guard units and other members of our national IC like the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and DHS.

On an all-hazard/all-threat basis, the tactical gaps between our nation’s collective IC and the local emergency management professionals and practitioners can limit the missions for successful emergency management and may even cause harm or death to U.S. persons. Such threats and hazards can include, but are not limited to, those that generate domestic incidents where the traditional tradecraft of the IC may come into play, such as acts of terrorism or materialized, onshore national security concerns.

It is also worth noting that these same IC groups have access to intelligence generated or adversely impacted by other threats and hazards like natural ones. This also includes cascading adverse impacts like the Key Bridge collapse in 2024 [7] or complex aspects of human-made accidents like the massive train derailment in East Palestine, OH, in 2023 [8].

In many countries, including the United States, the thought of intelligence sharing external to homeland security and law enforcement may be a new concept. It is quite unusual for there to be curation (collection, analysis, and distribution) of actionable intelligence beyond the traditional silos of the IC. In other countries (e.g., New Zealand [9]), that curation of actionable EMINT is already integrated into their overall emergency management doctrine, policies, practices, and procedures, regardless of the type of threat or hazard. And such an emergency management viewpoint is much broader than the vantage point of homeland security and law enforcement by themselves.

As shown in Figure 2, EMINT is actionable intelligence necessary for life safety, incident stabilization, property/asset protection, economic/environmental stability, and recovery from the adverse impacts of hazards generated by any threat [10].

EMINT needs to be curated and disseminated on a “need-to-know” basis before, during, and after incidents occur. It can be curated from open-source intelligence (OSINT), human intelligence, geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), economic intelligence, weather intelligence (WEATHINT), communications intelligence, and other intelligence sources.

EMINT is novel and agile in its definition [11]. For many U.S. civilian-led incidents, there is the current model of situational awareness which can represent “what is happening now” and what might happen “next.” This tends to be self-limiting for those incident management teams (IMTs) who do not have strong connections to law enforcement or their own connection to intelligence and homeland security built into their current steady-state structure. Those emergency management groups can be siloed away from the intelligence available. On the other hand, there are jurisdictions who have recognized and corrected this. For example, New Jersey’s Office of Emergency Management is operated by their state police, and their Fusion Center [12] with standing members of their state-level Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness residing in the same building as their state emergency operations center.

When considering the overall concept of intelligence gathering, analysis, and distribution only applying to criminal activities or terrorism, the activities of EMINT are generally not performed. This severely limits command and control (C2) of any incident.

There are many cases where intelligence was needed when information was only provided or limited to law enforcement organizations. For example, there are major differences between what is defined as weather information, weather forecasting, and WEATHINT. Weather information can include historical data and trend analysis and represent what is happening now, as well as what has happened in the past. Weather forecasting (e.g., meteorology and climatology) can represent what might happen next. WEATHINT is achieved when cross-walked with population centers, socially vulnerable population areas, critical infrastructure sites, and more. It represents the how we will be adversely impacted, as well as many of the what ifs needed by C2 for successful consequence management.

A straight line can be drawn for many threats—terrorism and domestic violent extremism included—to local hazards with adverse impacts to populations. This can occur where emergency management (not just law enforcement) has jurisdictional responsibilities for life safety during response operations, as well as overall protection and prevention aspects on a whole-community basis. In addition, there is a typology of disasters originating as natural threats and becoming technological hazards or Natech incidents [13]. The probability of a bad actor capitalizing on the adverse impacts from a disaster created by a natural threat and then cascading it into a greater disaster is very real.

This article will introduce EMINT to a military audience to enhance and amplify the U.S. Department of Defense’s Support to Civilian Authorities [14], encouraging the exploration of the tactical view for shared intelligence support via Joint Publication (JP) 2-0: “Joint Intelligence” [15]; JP 3-28: “Defense Support to Civil Authorities” [16]; the recently updated DoD Directive 5240.01 [17]; and other DoD doctrine from a local civilian emergency management perspective (and not a law enforcement one). The deliberative planning needed to create/refine emergency operations plans, organize staffing, allow for access to equipment/systems, and conduct joint training and exercises must be established for steady-state and disaster-state operations on incidents of scale. This is distinctly critical for civilian-led and DoD-supported operations.

Problem Statement

The current tactical model is too focused on terrorism/counterterrorism and needs improvement. Not enough is systemically being performed for the nation’s “Duty to Warn” [18] to extend through a local jurisdiction’s emergency management besides its law enforcement entities. Because of this, the following needs addressed:

• There is the U.S. Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s) Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council [19]. Does this group operate at the tactical level? Is the sharing of information, in fact, the sharing of intelligence? Does it flow in both directions? How can the private sector receive timely tactical outputs/warnings with actionable EMINT? A global CrowdStrike software error occurred in 2024, with almost all the economic sectors and large private businesses becoming adversely impacted for days and longer. There was a well-communicated and collaborative aspect for solutioning among governmental resources and the private sector. Would this all be the same for a cyberattack from a foreign adversary?
• Will the DOJ continue to limit its intelligence sharing to only law enforcement, as shown in Figure 3? Or will it expand the bidirectional networking the nation needs for protecting the critical infrastructure possibly through its InfraGard program and with members of the private sector? Can the DoD support to the Defense Industrial Base services be expanded beyond the scope of National Security Memorandum 22 [20]?

• DHS now has a “National Threat Evaluation and Reporting Master Trainer Program” [22] to build national capacity in Behavioral Threat Assessment and Management (BTAM) techniques and best practices. BTAM teams follow several IC tradecraft methods (and are also championed by the U.S. Secret Service); local BTAM teams may not have direct access to law enforcement intelligence. There are BTAM teams in the private sector, including nonpublic K12 schools and higher educational institutions. This DHS program is limited to public sector employees of federal or state, local, tribal, and territorial agencies.

There are current challenges with declassifying or reclassifying intelligence to generate actionable and timely EMINT. This includes the desire for a formalized construct to potentially move EMINT from classified to controlled unclassified information (CUI) for EM use and not just be limited to law enforcement officials.

This should include the need for vetting, training, and credentialling potential team members from other agencies and jurisdictions and supporting the use of classified EMINT on civilian-led, domestic disaster operations.

• This will benefit a unified command. The prime example of this is the potential concept of operations from the USCG, which includes an intelligence/investigations branch in its Incident Command System [23] and roles for intelligence officers in steady-state operations [24].
• States and territories now utilize the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) to coordinate resources during disasters with each other. EMAC sharing can and has included National Guard units [25]. The operational and tactical questions of how existing military intelligence can be shared to/from these units assigned to civilian-supported missions remain open. Even interoperable communications systems between military units and the unified command group remain a challenge.
• IMTs and incident management assistance teams are civilians who come from the staff of various states and territories and can be requested by governors to support incidents in other jurisdictions. They are specialists in intelligence, some who already have various levels of security clearances, and leadership individuals who could be prequalified to work with classified material and within a sensitive compartmented information facility [26].

Literature Review

Separate solutions exist today which are sector specific or limited to a single jurisdiction as previously noted; however, the primary academic resources aligned to the novel concept of EMINT are still being developed (e.g., cyber threat intelligence impacts to/from EMINT [27]). These existing policies, procedures, directives, etc., are primarily designed to provide the “guardrails” for the use of military personnel in civilian-led incidents. The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 [28] comes to the forefront for many people, but the use of EMINT is beyond law enforcement. There is a scarcity of detail relating to emergency management coordination with civilian authorities and toward the U.S. military’s operational continuity and local continuity of government (COOP/COG), as impacted from domestic threat hazards of any kind. The following publications show existing DoD publications connecting military intelligence to civilian support:

• JP 2-0: “Joint Intelligence” has as its focus the intelligence sharing within the military but does have a section to “enable civil authority” on pp. IV–24 of the 2013 OSINT version [15].
• JP 3-28: “Defense Support of Civil Authorities” has Chapter II “Supporting a Comprehensive All Hazards Response” but does not mention intelligence [16].
• MCWP 5-10: “Marine Corps Planning Process” has examples of intelligence types and uses but no specific references to civilian support or intelligence sharing/curation. As expected, the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) organizational structure for its civilian support is like the civilian Incident Command System Model [29].
• The USCG Incident Management Handbook 2014 [30] has a section on intelligence/investigations (pp. 4–12); however, activating that section under a unified command is not always conducted. During the Key Bridge collapse incident in 2024, neither an intelligence nor an investigations branch was initially established by the USCG [31]. This may have been due to the quick assessment that it was an accident and not an act of terrorism. However, this precludes a unified command from using these same resources and intelligence curation to support C2 and other elements of EMINT.

Case Examples

The most prominent case of a failed “Duty to Warn” from IC elements and/or intelligence sources directly to provide EMINT to a civilian individual is related to the murder of Mr. Jamal Khashoggi [32]. There have been publicly identified successes recently, including warning Ms. Taylor Swift of a terror plot toward her in Austria in 2024 [33]. European Union countries appear to blend their national intelligence models more effectively, and there are even plans in the United Kingdom to consolidate nonmilitary intelligence capabilities and remove organizational boundaries [34].

In the healthcare and public health sectors, the CrowdStrike example with work through the DHS’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) provided and sought swift and comprehensive EMINT to and from the private sector [35]. For contagions and novel vaccines, the 2024 example of the Marburg virus in Rwanda [36] and an experimental vaccine from Sabin [37] will have both current U.S. military implications/impacts, potential impacts to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services/Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response’s Strategic National Stockpile, and subsequent distribution through military units. The reverse of this EMINT application could be from a potential civilian access to freeze-dried plasma, cryopreserved platelets, etc., from the U.S. Army Medical Materiel Development Activity (USAMMDA) [38].

For individual active assailant attacks, including the mis/disinformation campaigns of K-12 school swatting examples tracked and monitored by the FBI, there are several nexus points for cross-border threats becoming actualized hazards in the United States [39]. The alerts for these threats do not always make it past law enforcement officials to their intended targets. Unfortunately, there are also connections between the U.S. military and active assailant attacks, including the 2013 Washington Navy Yard shooting by a military contractor [40] and the 2023 Lewiston Maine shooting by an Army Reservist [41]. These attacks can also have long-term risk management and financial adverse impacts to the military [42].

Emergency management has learned and applied some lessons from the attack on the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021 [43]. However, there are still many open issues, including possible alternative pathways for civilian support by the various National Guard units in and around the District of Columbia [44]. CISA and other groups have bolstered EMINT distribution to the public regarding election interference from other nation states. Per U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) guidance for the Electoral College count event in 2025 [45], the U.S. Capitol Complex has implemented National Special Security Event protections.

For GEOINT and the U.S. military’s National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) [46], there are already current inroads for EMINT sharing through the use of Homeland Infrastructure Foundation-Level Data from the Geospatial Management Office of the DHS. Could this be a conduit for more CUI GEOINT from the U.S. military? There is humanitarian assistance and disaster relief from an international/outside-the-continental-United States perspective [47]. As noted in DoD Directive 5240.01 [17], the military’s ordering of NGA products and services does have detailed exceptions for humanitarian missions and support to civilian authorities during disasters.

Discussion

There are two goals for this article: (1) an increased awareness of the needs and potential capabilities for actionable EMINT sharing between DoD groups and local emergency management officials to break through and bridge those silos as far and wide as needed and (2) the initiation of further discussions and debate on the changes to legacy protocols and procedures needed to implement these changes while remaining within existing U.S. laws and preserving the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens. EMINT is primarily in support of life safety. “Life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness” [48] does start with life.

Applying any of the emergency management principles without including intelligence curation to benefit emergency management missions is a formula for disaster. This must also include the applicable intelligence flow from the IC through domestic agencies down to the local emergency management groups who need it. Imagine if a credible threat to a specific target in the United States were curated by the Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council [49] and only stopped at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Should some EMINT elements be shared through the FBI or DHS to then move downward to the local emergency management entities who support the target?

Military Intelligence is much broader than just warfare and espionage and needed to protect members of the military within the United States. Protecting and preventing adverse life safety impacts from all threats and hazards is what EMINT supports, including protecting civilian and military responders themselves [50]. Just as the military is not the only curator or recipient for elements of national security intelligence, law enforcement cannot be the same for EMINT.

Conclusions

The connections between the civilian members of the IC (FBI and DHS) should be strengthened in support of CUI modalities for the curation of EMINT. The U.S. Fire Administration’s Emergency Management and Response Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EMR-ISAC) and other ISACs can bridge OSINT to and from CUI through the DHS’s Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN). Could HSIN be a conduit for the Homeland Defense & Security Information Analysis Center (HDIAC) and other information analysis center material now being supported through the U.S. Air Force server?

There is national value in understanding the “state of the union” when it comes to the coordination and collaboration between military and civilian units, especially as it relates to information and intelligence sharing surrounding a disaster or incident of scale. This includes active-duty federal military units who support the local jurisdictions they are physically located within and Reserve and National Guard units or groups in all the states and territories. U.S. military intelligence analysts may find historical references for EMINT usage in the Joint Lessons Learned Info System from the Defense Logistics Agency. Learning the specifics as to which military grouping does what they do now—specifically how EMINT is curated or even compartmentalized—may be a worthwhile technical inquiry (TI) for a qualified submitter to request. Examples of prior EMINT-related TIs include “Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) Sections 301-303” [51] as well as the “Agricultural Security Risks” TI [52].

DoD groups like the Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (CFE-DM) [53] may benefit from such a TI. While theirs is a global mandate—and typically involved DoD resources utilized by inviting other countries for humanitarian purposes, the conduits and pathways for EMINT to move from DoD to U.S.-based local emergency management can be aligned. Another candidate for a TI might be the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (OUSD[I&S]) [54].

In many cases, it is the preincident knowledge and networking among partners that is more beneficial than the force multipliers of staff and equipment for response and recovery missions. (The U.S. Army Corp of Engineers’ “Emergency Operations” work [55] is one strong exception to this postulate.) Incorporating whole-of-government/whole-community partners into the planning, training, and exercising needed for EMINT will bridge those silos and benefit the overall DoD missions in support of civilian authorities.

As highlighted in Figure 4, there are other federal entities, as well as academic, trade associations, nonprofit, and private groups, who can help craft the policies and protocols for curating EMINT beyond the various DoD groups. Examples include the EMR-ISAC group [56] from the U.S. Fire Administration, the Rand Corporation [57], the Strategic Consortium of Intelligence Professionals [58], and CEMIR [59].

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Biography

Michael Prasad is a certified emergency manager and president of the International Association of Emergency Managers-USA Region 2. He is the executive director of the Center for Emergency Management Intelligence Research and a national-level expert on mass care, which involves feeding and sheltering children in disasters. As a professional writer on emergency management policies and procedures, he authored the book titled “Emergency Management Threats and Hazards: Water.” Mr. Prasad holds a BBA in management information systems from Ohio University and an M.A. in emergency and disaster management from American Public University.