## Understanding and Responding to Biological Threats



#### PRESENTED BY:

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### UNDERSTANDING & RESPONDING TO BIOLOGICAL THREATS

Christina Baxter, Ph.D. christina@hazard3.com سینقاتلکم بسیلام لطالما قتلتم به ابر WILL FIGHT YOU WITH THE SAME WEAPON YOU USED TO KILL INNOCENTS



#### Now that the Façade's all Cracked...



Our response to COVID and Domestic Terrorism events is closely watched by our adversaries...They continuously highlight that now is the time to attack.

REF: ISIS Naba Editorial, "War with Crisis-Ridden America, January 7, 2021

REF: SITE, April 2020

#### The World We Live In...



International forums discussed ways to propagate the Corona Virus with specific targets of the public safety, military, and medical communities ("Easy Targets")

REF: Greenb1rds media outlet, March2020

REF: Voice of Hind magazine (India), April 2020

#### **The Threat from Within...**



Domestic forums specified ways to spread the virus with specific targets of politicians, police, and the medical community

REF: White Supremacy Channels, Telegram, JAN-MAR 2020

#### **Emerging Microbial Threats**

- Recent decades have witnessed the appearance of dozens of infectious diseases that were previously unrecognized or that attained new geographic reach, incidence, or severity – including antimicrobial resistance
  - Increasing population size and density
  - More rapid and frequent travel
  - Increased number of vulnerable individuals
  - Growing global commerce
  - Mass production in agriculture
  - Changes in land use and human habitats

- HIV Chimpanzees, 1<sup>st</sup> known human case 1959 (DRC)
- Ebola/Marburg bats as the possible reservoir, first outbreak 1976 in central Africa
- SARS-CoV-1 & SARS-CoV-2 China
- Avian Influenza (H7N9 China 612 deaths by Sept 2017)
- Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA)
- Zika
- Hemorrhagic Coronavirus

Naturally occurring pathogens have spilled into humans or have evolved in the human population

#### **Global Outbreaks Today**



Occurring around the World today: Anthrax, Cholera, Foot-and-Mouth Disease, Rift Valley Fever, Polio, Dengue, **Encephalitis**, Monkey Pox, H<sub>x</sub>N<sub>y</sub>, Swine Fever, Hantavirus, Lassa Fever, and **Coronavirus** 

### Current HOT Topics in BioThreats

Focus remains on toxins as targeted assassination or small-to-mid scale terrorism

tools

#### **Evolving BioThreat**

#### - سنقاتلکم بسلاح لطالما قتلتم به ابریاء - WE WILL FIGHT YOU WITH THE SAME WEAPON YOU USED TO KILL INNOCENTS —



<mark>سترون فتك اسلحتكم في بلادكم</mark> YOU WILL SEE THE DANGER OF YOUR WEAPONS IN YOUR OWN

### BIO TERROR

Internet "chatter" focusing on the use of biological weapons remains at an elevated level

REF: Telegram Channel, July 2018

#### **Evolving Biological Threat**

سموم الحيوانات حر لاستخراج سلسلة ( لتصنيع لاستخدام خذ بثأرك منهم أيها الموحد تقديم مؤسسة الصقرى للعلوم الحربية سموم الأشجار حرد 5 الدفلي ساسلة خذ بثأرك منهم أيها الموحد حمله الأر تقديم مؤسسة الصقري للعلوم الحربية DOWNLOAD NOW متجراج | التحضير | الاستخدام PDF تحميل ⊻

"How To" videos continue to be released with higher level of details effectively removing the need for SMEs

REF: AF Media, August 2018

REF: Al Saqri Telegram Channel, September 2018

#### **Creating a Biological Weapon**



#### Acquire Specimens

- Soil from sites of recent outbreaks
- Commercial cultures
- Other scientists
- Universities or hospitals



Access Technical Information

- Internet
- Technical journals



Access Equipment

- Internet
- Laboratory supply
- DIY biology programs
- Catalogues
- Steal from universities and hospitals



Culture and Propagate Agent

- Expertise in bacteria and viruses
- Knowledge

   of
   biochemistry
   and
   fermentation



 Expertise in airborne materials (milling & isolation)

Difficult

Disperse Weapons

- UAVs
- Used to be relegated to planes, cars, trucks, etc.

"How To" videos contain guidance from material acquisition through propagation, weaponization, and dispersal

#### **Main Threats of Concern – Ricin**

- Ricin (RT) is contained within the seeds of the castor bean plant
  - Ricin toxin is water soluble
- Toxicology
  - LD<sub>50(oral)</sub>: 20 mg/kg
    Time to death ~ 85 hours
  - Toxic dose (oral) for average human (80 kg): 1.6 g
  - LD<sub>50(inh)</sub>: 3-5 μg/kg
     Time to death ~ 60 hours
  - Toxic dose (inh) for average human (80 kg): 240 μg
  - LD<sub>50(inj)</sub>: 24 μg/kg
     Time to death ~ 100 hours
  - Toxic dose (inj) for average human (80 kg): 1.9 mg

No dermal toxicity

#### Inhalation and injection threat

#### **Ricin Plot in Germany – June 2018**



# Plot to carry out biological attack using RICIN is foiled in Germany

- 29-year-old Tunisian, identified only as Sief Allah H, was arrested on Wednesday
- ullet He had 'started procuring material including seeds needed for creation of ricin'
- Police who searched Cologne flat said he succeeded in creating toxin this month
- Probe continuing into how suspect planned to substance, but prosecutors say he was working on an attack in Germany

#### **Confiscated in Apartment:**

- 3,150 castor bean seeds
- 84.3 mg Ricin
- Bomb making components

#### Ricin as an injection (fragmentation) and inhalation threat

# Creighton dorm evacuated after student tries to make ricin

Police and firefighters in Omaha, Nebraska, evacuated a Creighton University dormitory after a student told emergency room staff that she had tried to make the poison ricin in her dorm room in an attempt to harm herself

By The Associated Press January 15, 2021, 4:31 PM • 2 min read

f y 🖻



An Omaha police officer stands inside of the Davis Square Apartments at Creighton University on Friday, Jan. 15, 2021. Police and firefighters evacuated the dormitory overnight after a student told emergency room staff that she had tried to make the poison ricin in her dorm room in an attempt to harm herself. The Omaha World-Herald reports that officials also shut down the Creighton University Medical Center emergency room on the university campus as a precaution. (Chris Machian/Omaha World-Herald via AP) Less <

#### Ingestion as a suicide method...1.6 g ingestion followed by 85 hours to death...

#### **Main Threats of Concern – Abrin**



- Abrin is derived from the rosary pea
  - Abrin is water soluble
- Toxicology
  - $LD_{50(oral)}$ : 10 1000 µg/kg
  - Toxic dose (oral) for average human (80 kg): 0.8 mg
  - LD<sub>50(inh)</sub>: 3.3 μg/kg (mice)
  - Toxic dose (inh) for average human (80 kg): 240 μg
  - $LD_{50(inj)}$ : 0.3 µg/kg
  - Toxic dose (inj) for average human (80 kg): 24 μg
  - No dermal toxicity

#### **Main Threats of Concern – Saxitoxin (STX)**

- Saxitoxin, a potent neurotoxin, in a paralytic shellfish toxin (PST)
  - Resultant illness: Paralytic shellfish poisoning (PSP)
  - Commonly associated with consumption of shellfish contaminated by toxic algal blooms
  - Synthetic production routes are published
  - Also known as chemical weapon TZ
- Toxicology
  - LD<sub>50(oral)</sub>: 5.7 μg/kg
  - Toxic dose (oral) for average human (80 kg): 0.5 mg
  - LD<sub>50(inj)</sub>: ~ 0.6 μg/kg
  - Toxic dose (inj) for average human (80 kg): 50 μg
  - Toxic dose rate (inhalation) for average human (80 kg): 5 mg·min/m<sup>3</sup>



#### **Main Threats of Concern – Tetrodotoxin (TTX)**



- TTX causes loss of sensation, and paralysis of voluntary muscles including the diaphragm and intercostal muscles, stopping breathing
- Toxicology
  - The toxin can enter the body of a victim by ingestion, injection, or inhalation, or through abraded skin
  - $LD_{50(oral)}$  for mice: 334 µg/kg
  - $LD_{50(inj)}$  for mice: 8 µg/kg
  - Symptoms typically develop within 30 minutes of ingestion, but may be delayed by up to four hours; however, if the dose is fatal, symptoms are usually present within 17 minutes of ingestion
- In the U.S., tetrodotoxin appears on the select agents list of the Department of Health and Human Services, and scientists must register with HHS to use tetrodotoxin in their research.
  - Investigators possessing less than 500 mg are exempt from regulation

#### Main Threats of Concern – Botulinum Toxin (BTX)

- Toxicology
  - Botulinum toxin is the most poisonous substance known.
  - Intoxication can occur naturally as a result of either wound or intestinal infection or by ingesting preformed toxin in food.
  - LD<sub>50(IV or IM)</sub>: 1.3–2.1 ng/kg
  - LD<sub>50 (oral)</sub>: 1000 ng/kg
  - LD<sub>50(inh)</sub>: 10–13 ng/kg
  - Symptoms develop relatively slowly (over several days)
- Weaponization
  - Aum Shinrikyo in 1990



#### **Biological Warfare – "Petalominium"**



الارهاب البيولوجي

TFRRDR

#### Is there a new agent amongst us?

REF: Telegram Channel, August 2018 (3X)

#### **Petalominium Production**

استخلاص البيكتيريا:

انتفاخ المرطبان كعلامة

عـن نجـاح العمليـة، بعد

عشـرة أيـام تتكـون مادة

لزجــة بلــون القهوة ( بنى

محمـز ) علـی سـطح الماء

قم بسـحبها بواسـطة إبرة

حقـن أو بالملعقـة مع توخـى الحذر



Q1401

#### Petalominium = Botulinum; resulted from a phonetic translation

REF: Al Sagri Insitute, August 2018

#### **Toxicity Comparison Across the Toxins**

	LD <sub>50(inh)</sub>	LD <sub>50(inj)</sub>	LD <sub>50(oral)</sub>
Ricin	3-5 μg/kg	24 µg/kg	20 mg/kg
Abrin	3.3 µg/kg	0.3 µg/kg	10-1000 µg/kg
Botulinum	10–13 ng/kg	1.3–2.1 ng/kg	1 μg/kg
Saxitoxin	n.d.	0.6 µg/kg	5.7 μg/kg
Tetrodotoxin	n.d.	8 μg/kg	334 μg/kg

Toxicity: BTX >> Abrin/STX > TTX > Ricin

#### **Advanced Biotechnology**

- Synthetic biology itself is not harmful the concern level depends on specific applications and capabilities that it enables
- "The U.S. government should pay close attention to this rapidly progressing field, just as it did to advances in chemistry and physics during the Cold War era"
  - Chair, National Academy of Science Working Group on Emerging Biotechnology Tools (2017)
- Synthetic biology blurs the lines between chemical and biological weapons
  - High potency molecules could be produced through simple genetic pathways and modest resources (e.g. fentanyl produced by engineered yeast)
- Overcoming knowledge barriers is key to malicious use of synthetic biology Russian publication of *B. anthracis* resistance to antibiotics

Advances in biotechnology need to be monitored closely

#### **Advancing Biotechnology – Concerns**



2012 c> increase in dual-use concerns when two research groups elucidated how to increase airborne transmissibility of the Avian H5N1 virus through genetic modification

National Academy of Science Working Group on Emerging Biotechnology Tools (2017)

#### **Advancing Biotechnology – Enabling Equipment**

- Microfluidics chip-scale chemistry involving liquids flowing through and mixing via channels that enable control over reactions and byproducts
  - Implications for biological and chemical weapons
  - Reduces equipment requirements and footprint evading treaty and convention restrictions
  - Enables rapid production on demand and can be used outside of a traditional laboratory

# HUMAN ORGANS-ON-CHIPS



There is no longer a requirement for large scale scientific equipment

Photo Credit: Wyss Institute at Harvard University

#### **Advancing Biotechnology – DIY BIO**

#### Bay Area biologist's gene-editing kit lets do-it-yourselfers play God at the kitchen table

By Lisa M. Krieger | lkrieger@mercurynews.com

POSTED: 01/11/2016 08:51:59 PM PST | UPDATED: 3 MONTHS AGO

"I want to democratize science," said Zayner, whose left arm is etched with the tattoo "Build Something Beautiful"



Scientist Josiah Zayner, 34, keeps bacteria engineered to produce human insulin as part of the Open Insulin Project in his refrigerator in Burlingame, Calif., on Tuesday, Dec. 15, 2015. (John Green/Bay Area News Group) (JOHN GREEN)



#### Poly-labs have a major impact on responder safety

#### **Minimizing the Potential Negative Impacts of Synthetic Biology**



Systematic Review Article, Bioeng. Biotechnol. 06 October 2020, https://doi.org/10.3389/fbioe.2020.571672

#### **DIY BIO and Bioterrorism**



Security and Privacy

## Stopping the DIY bio-terrorists, US military embraces AI and Ginkgo Bioworks

🕐 9th July 2018 🔍 0

"As the cost of powerful DIY gene editing kits continues to fall, bioterrorism is going to be on the rise so we need a way to defend against it."

REF: Fanatical Futurist, July 9, 2018

#### **Recommended Reading**

#### THE APOLLO PROGRAM FOR BIODEFENSE

WINNING THE RACE AGAINST BIOLOGICAL THREATS

A RECOMMENDATION BY THE BIPARTISAN COMMISSION ON BIODEFENSE

January 2021

#### A NATIONAL BLUEPRINT FOR BIODEFENSE:

LEADERSHIP AND MAJOR REFORM NEEDED TO OPTIMIZE EFFORTS

BIPARTISAN REPORT OF THE BLUE RIBBON STUDY PANEL ON BIODEFENSE October 2015



The National Academies of SCIENCES - ENGINEERING - MEDICINE

CONSENSUS STUDY REPORT

# Synthetic Biology





You must understand the threat before you have to respond to it







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