

# Big Data and Big Implications for Bio-cybersecurity



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*GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY*

# **Big Data and Big Implications for Bio-cybersecurity**

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# Acknowledgements

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
# **Neuroscience...** *puts the brain at our fingertips*



# Progress in Neuroscience


## Heuristic Reciprocity

**Tools-to-Theory**  
**Theory-to-Tools**



# Advances in Neuroscience

- Translationally viable
  - Anatomic-physiological correlation
  - Individual trajectories of expression
  - Populational variation and pre-dispositional assessment



# **Integrative Scientific Convergence (ISC) in Neuroscience**

## **Conjoins:**

- Natural sciences**
- Biotechnology**
- Anthro/social science(s)**

**Focus upon assessment, access and manipulation  
of neural structure and cognitive, emotional  
and behavioral function(s):**

**-Individuals**

**-Groups**


**RELIANT UPON DATA INTEGRATION, SHARING  
AND USE...**

**BIG DATA**




# Validity-Reliability-Utility Issues

- Need for large volume data banks
- Individual, cohort and population data tiers
- Intra- and inter-tier integration potential
- Longitudinal input requirement
- Rapid (real-time) access requirement
- Non-anonymity




# NeuroCyber/Big Data Approaches

- Maximize storage and retrieval
- Parallel computing
- Scalable, customizable
- Accessible and sharable




# Data Acquisition and Tracking


- Across domains
  - Cellular-to-social
- Across levels
  - Individual, cohorts, groups, populations
- Across geographic locales
  - Complete geo-spatial access
- Across time
  - Individual and historical timespans
- Across groups
  - Comparatively and normatively




# Individual Data




# Group-analytic Data





# The “Black Box” approach



# Caveats

- If it's assessable, it's accessible
- If it's tagged, it's targetable
- *If it's stackable, it's hackable*
- What's hackable is manipulable
- What's controllable is corruptible





# Engaging NeuroCyberS/T as a “Weapon” ...

**A.) *n.* (Old English) 1) “a means of contending against another “ and 2) “...something used to injure, defeat, or destroy”**

***and***

**B.) An agent that...**

**1) *mitigates aggression and fosters thoughts and feelings of affiliation or passivity;* 2) incurs burdens of morbidity, disability or suffering and in this way “neutralizes” potential opponents, or 3) induces mortality**

# Weaponized NeuroCyberS/T

## *Tactical and Strategic Impact(s)*

### Effects

- Proximate (Tactical)
  - Accessibility and use/misuse of data
  - Development of “precision pathologies”
- Intermediate (Tactical-Strategic)
  - Data modification
  - Public life effect(s)
- Distal (Strategic)
  - Economic impacts
  - Social impacts
  - Net impact on “New Global”milieu




# NeuroCyberS/T to Affect Opposing Elements

- **Weapon of Mass Destruction possible...**
  - RDTE/Use in ways (e.g.- “precision pathologies”) that “side-step” current BTWC, CWC
- **Weapon of Mass *DISRUPTION*...**
  - RDTE not necessarily bounded by BTWC/CWC
  - Highly effective; both non-kinetic and kinetic
  - Can be covert/non-attributable in use
  - Incurs “ripple effects” on/across scales and levels

See: Giordano J, *Nat Def*, 2017; Giordano J, ‘Neurotechnology, global relations and national security: Shifting contexts and neuroethical demands’; and: Wurzman R, Giordano, J. ‘NEURINT and neuroweapons’ ; In: Giordano J (ed.) *Neurotechnology in National Security and Defense*, CRC Press (2015).

# NeuroCyberS/T on World Stage

- **Global NeuroS/T Economic Predictions 2020**
  - **China (on pace to out spend U.S. by an order of magnitude over the next 10 years)**
    - Predicted 60-68% increase in RDTE by 2025
    - Predicted 50-53% market share by 2025
  - **Russia**
  - **Iran**
  - **North Korea**
  - **Virtual nations**
  - **Non-state actors**



**Lack of focus and commitment on our part provides exponential growth opportunities for others**

# Core Questions and Issues

- What do we do *with* the information and capability we have?
- What do we do *about* the information and capability we don't?
- Given what *can* be done, how do we (and who will) decide upon what *should* be done?
- Will be able to do what we decide we should?

# **“Preparedness Process”**


- **Identify risk scenarios that evolve from specified events**
- **Craft strategies for preemption, preparation, response, and amelioration**
- **Examine (setting, exploring, and exploiting) conditions at the operational level, across all elements, and the physical, cognitive and informational domains**
- **Create strategies that are relevant, durable, and can be targeted for demographics and psychographics in the face of severe cultural impact**
- **Identify/plan a robust framework to remain effective and adaptive to a changing environment as risks and society (co-)evolve.**

# Key Steps

## Core premise: Need for NeuroCyber Tools & Methods


- Need for NINA now (see Kostiuik, 2012)
- Need for programmatic neurobiocyber-security
- Need for ongoing surveillance (of field and RDTEU loci/foci)
- Need for discourse/dialog
- Need for communication

# Four Thrust Strategy



**Necessity of a Whole of Nation approach to identify, characterize, counter, and exploit/prevent emerging technologies that threaten or erode United States' security and stability**







**Thrust 1**  
Increase  
Awareness



**Thrust 2**  
Quantify the  
Threat



**Thrust 3**  
Counter the  
Threat



**Thrust 4**  
Prevent/Delay  
Future Adversary  
Effectiveness



Academic Institutions



Law Enforcement



Department of Defense



Research Centers



DHS



DHS



National Labs



State Department



Intelligence Community



Industry



Intelligence Community

# Summary

- ❖ **Current NeuroCyberS/T growing exponentially: clear and present danger to U.S. national security and stability**
- ❖ **Identified risk/threat should prompt:**
  - ❖ **Funded research in technologies, innovations, countermeasures, and solutions**
  - ❖ **Capabilities to address and defeat evolving kinetic and non-kinetic threats**
  - ❖ **Remaining ahead of competitors'/adversaries' abilities to exploit U.S.**
  - ❖ **Whole of Nation approach for leveraging all sectors of national power**

*“Victorious warriors win first then go to war, while defeated warriors go to war first then seek to win.”*

*Sun Tzu*

# Additional Information

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# Contact

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