



### **Truth or Lie?**

Spoken Features of Trusted and Mistrusted Speech

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## Introduction HDIAC & Today's Topic



### **HDIAC Overview**

# What is the Homeland Defense & Security Information Analysis Center (HDIAC)?

One of three Department of Defense Information Analysis Centers

Responsible for acquiring, analyzing, and disseminating relevant scientific and technical information, in each of its eight focus areas, in support of the DoD and U.S. government R&D activities

#### **HDIAC's Mission**

Our mission is to be the go-to R&D/S&T and RDT&E leader within the homeland defense and security (HDS) community, by providing timely and relevant information, superior technical solutions, and quality products to the DoD and HDS Communities of Interest/Communities of Practice.

### **HDIAC** Overview

#### HDIAC Subject Matter Expert (SME) Network

HDIAC SMEs are experts in their field(s), and, typically, have been published in technical journals and publications.

SMEs are involved in a variety of HDIAC activities

- Authoring HDIAC Journal articles
- Answering HDIAC Technical Inquiries
- Engaging in active discussions in the HDIAC community
- Assisting with Core Analysis Tasks
- Presenting webinars

If you are interested in applying to become a SME, please visit HDIAC.org or email info@hdiac.org.



#### **Presenters**





**Julia Hirschberg** is Percy K. and Vida L. W. Hudson Professor of Computer Science at Columbia University. She was department chair from 2012-2018. She previously worked at Bell Laboratories and AT&T Labs where she created the HCI Research Department. She has been editor of *Computational Linguistics* and *Speech Communication*, is a fellow of AAAI, ISCA, ACL, ACM, and IEEE, and a member of the National Academy of Engineering and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. She received the IEEE James L. Flanagan Speech and Audio Processing Award and the ISCA Medal for Scientific Achievement. She currently serves on the IEEE Speech and Language Processing Technical Committee, is co-chair of the CRA-W Board, and has worked for diversity for many years at AT&T and Columbia. She works on spoken language processing and NLP, studying text-to-speech synthesis, spoken dialogue systems, entrainment in conversation, detection of deceptive and emotional speech, hedging behavior, and linguistic code-switching (language mixing).

**Sarah Ita Levitan** is a postdoctoral Research Scientist in the Department of Computer Science at Columbia University. Her research interests are in spoken language processing, and she is currently working on identifying acoustic-prosodic and linguistic indicators of trustworthy speech, as well as identifying linguistic characteristics of trustworthy news. She received her PhD in Computer Science at Columbia University, advised by Dr. Julia Hirschberg, and her dissertation addressed the problem of automatic deception detection from speech. Sarah Ita was a 2018 Knight News Innovation Fellow and a recipient of the NSF Graduate Research Fellowship and the NSF IGERT From Data to Solutions fellowship. She previously worked as a graduate research summer intern at Google and at Interactions LLC.



# Overview

### Outline

#### Introduction

#### **Deceptive speech**

- Corpus collection, annotation, feature extraction
- Automatic deception detection
- Individual differences in production and perception of lies

#### **Trusted vs. mistrusted speech**

- Crowd-sourced ratings of our deception data
- Comparing mistrusted speech with actual lies
- Automatic classification of trust and mistrust



#### **Deceptive Speech**

#### **Deliberate choice to mislead**

- Without prior notification
- To gain some advantage or to avoid some penalty

#### Deception does not include:

- Self-deception, delusion, pathological behavior
- Theater
- Falsehoods due to ignorance/error

*Everyday (White) Lies* very hard to detect But Serious Lies may be easier...



#### Why might Serious Lies be easier to detect?

#### Hypotheses in research and among practitioners:

- Our cognitive load is increased when we lie because...
  - We must keep our story straight
  - We must remember what we have and have not said
- Our fear of detection is increased if...
  - We believe our target is difficult to fool
  - Stakes are high: serious rewards and/or punishments

All this makes it hard for us to control potential indicators of deception

#### Humans are Very Poor at Detecting Lies (Aamodt & Mitchell 2004 Meta-Study)

Group	#Studies	#Subjects	Accuracy %
Criminals	1	52	65.40
Secret service	4	34	64.12
Psychologists	4	508	61.56
Judges	2	194	59.01
Cops	8	511	55.16
Federal officers	4	341	54.54
Students	122	8,876	54.20
Detectives	5	341	51.16
Parole officers	1	32	40.42



### **Current Approaches to Deception Detection**

# *Automatic' methods* (polygraph, commercial products) no better than chance

#### Human training: e.g., John Reid & Associates

- Behavioral Analysis: Interview/Interrogation: no empirical support, e.g.
- Truth: I didn't take the money vs. Lie: I did not take the money (but non-native speakers use contractions less....)

Laboratory studies: Production and perception (facial expression, body posture/gesture, statement analysis, brain activation, odor,...)



### **Our Goal**


Conduct objective experiments on human subjects to identify spoken language cues to deception

Collect speech data and extract *acoustic-prosodic*, and *lexical cues* automatically

Examine Individual Differences: Take gender, ethnicity, culture, and personality factors into account as features in classification

Use *Machine Learning* techniques to train models to classify deceptive vs. non-deceptive speech and *use these to improve deception detection* by humans by creating better methods of identifying the *subtle cues humans may miss* and *training humans* as well: *Collaborative Al* 

#### **Deception Detection from Spoken Language**






### **Columbia Cross-Cultural Deception Corpus (CXD)**

Pair native speakers of SAE with native speakers of Mandarin Chinese, all speaking English, interviewing each other

#### Include

- Gender and personality information for all subjects
- Compare subjects with different cultural and language backgrounds





### The Big Five NEO-FFI (Costa & McCrae, 1992)

- Openness to Experience: "I have a lot of intellectual curiosity."
- Conscientiousness: "I strive for excellence in everything I do."
- Extraversion: "I like to have a lot of people around me."
- Neuroticism: "I often feel inferior to others."
- Agreeableness: "I would rather cooperate with others than compete with them."



### Our CXD Experiment





### **Motivation and Scoring**

#### Monetary motivation

- Success for interviewer:
  - Add \$1 for every correct judgment, truth or lie
  - Lose \$1 for every incorrect judgement
- Success for interviewee:
  - Add \$1 for every lie interviewer thinks is true
  - Lose \$1 for every lie interviewers thinks is a lie

Good liars tell the truth as much as possible when lying, so how do we know what's true or false for follow-up questions?

Interviewees press T/F keys after every phrase



#### **Columbia X-Cultural Deception Corpus**

 340 subjects, balanced by gender and native language (American English, Mandarin Chinese): 122 hours of speech

**Crowdsourced transcription**, automatic speech alignment (hand-corrected)

Interviewee speech segmented into

- Inter-pausal units (IPUs): 111,479
- Speaker turns: 43,706
- Question/answer sequences (Q/1<sup>st</sup> Response and Q/Resp+followup): 7,418







### TRUE or FALSE?









### TRUE or FALSE?





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#### **Features Extracted**

Text-based: n-grams, psycholinguistic, Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) (Pennybaker et al), word embeddings (GloVe trained on 2B tweets)

Speech-based: openSMILE IS09 (e.g. f0, intensity, speaking rate, voice quality)(386)

Gender, native language, NEO-FFIs personality scores and clusters

Syntactic features (complexity), entrainment, regional origin


Summary: Acoustic-prosodic and Linguistic Characteristics of Human Deception and Truth

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Deception Increased pitch & intensity max Poor speech planning Descriptive, detailed Complex Hedge Entrainment Truth Negation Cue phrases Cognitive process Function words

#### Deep Learning on Word Embeddings and openSmile Acoustic Features


- BLSTM-word embeddings
- DNN-openSMILE
- Hybrid: BLSTM-lexical + DNN-openSMILE




Mendels, Levitan et al. 2017, "Hybrid acoustic lexical deep learning approach for deception detection," Interspeech, Stockholm.

#### **Neural Network Models**

HE



#### **Machine Learning Using Additional Features**





# What Next Can We Learn from Gender and Native Language?

Extract simple acoustic/prosodic features from question responses Compare distributions of features over all and by gender and native language

- When interviewees lie vs. tell the truth
- When interviewees are trusted (believed) or are not
- When interviewers trust (believe) an interviewee or do not

#### Perform paired t-tests to compare feature means

 Tests for significance correct for family-wise Type I error by controlling the false discovery rate at α=0.05. (Parentheses indicate an uncorrected p <=0.05.)</li>



#### Individual Differences in Deceptive vs. Truthful Interviewee Speech by Gender and Native Language

Feature	Male	Female	English	Chinese	All
Pitch Max	F			F	F
Pitch Mean					
Intensity Max	F	(F)	F		F
Intensity Mean			(F)		
Speaking Rate				т	
Jitter		<b>(T)</b>			
Shimmer					
NHR					

**Deceptive True** 

### **Gender and Native Language: Analysis of <u>Interviewee</u> Traits**

**Mistrusted Trusted** 

Feature	Male	Female	English	Chinese	All
Pitch Max	(F)			(F)	(F)
Pitch Mean				F	
Intensity Max				F	F
Intensity Mean					
Speaking Rate	<b>(T)</b>	<b>(T)</b>		Т	т
Jitter		(T)	(т)		
Shimmer		(T)	Т		
NHR				F	

#### Individual Differences Between Interviewers' Judgments by Interviewer Gender and Native Language

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Feature	Male	Female	English	Chinese	All
Pitch Max		27 · · · · ·	F		(F)
Pitch Mean	(F)				
Intensity Max	(F)		(F)	(F)	F
Intensity Mean					
Speaking Rate	т		т	<b>(T)</b>	т
Jitter		F			
Shimmer		(F)			
NHR					

#### **Mistrusted Trusted**

#### **Games with a Purpose**

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Levitan et al. 2018, "LieCatcher: Game framework for collecting human judgments of deceptive speech," LREC 2018, Miyazaki.

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### **Crowd-sourcing Study**


5,340 utterances
3 judgments per utterance
431 unique annotators
38.9% male, 59.1% female, 2.1% unreported





### **Inter-annotator Agreement**

#### Number of annotators trusting utterances



Number of annotators trusting the utterance

Fleiss' kappa: 0.135 Truth bias – 65% trusted Truth Default Theory (T.R. Levine, 2014)



### **Lie Detection Ability**

**Overall accuracy = 49.93% - below random chance!** 

Females are better, and take longer to judge

People with jobs related to lie detection do not perform better, and take longer to judge



### **Characteristics of Trusted Speakers**

Gender Female speaker were trusted more than male speakers (X<sup>2</sup>(1)=5.1, N=5340, p<0.05)

Native language Native English speakers were trusted more than native Chinese speakers (X<sup>2</sup>(1)=30.22, N=5340, p<0.00001)

#### Personality

- Low Conscientiousness is most trusted
- High Openness to Experience is most trusted
- High Neuroticism is most trusted!



### Why are people so poor at lie detection?

Compare features of raters' trusted/mistrusted speech with features of actual deceptive/truthful speech



### **Features Examined**

Disfluency: "um...er" Complexity: more words, more detailed Affect: sentiment Uncertainty: "sort of", "probably" Creativity: difference from "standard" responses for same question Prosody: pitch, speaking rate, loudness



### Disfluency

Theory: lie-telling is more cognitively demanding than truth-telling

Features	
Has fille	d pause
# filled p	ause
Respons	e latency
Repetitio	on
False start	



### Disfluency

Theory: lie-telling is more cognitively demanding than truth-telling

Features	Trust
Has filled pause	$\downarrow \downarrow \downarrow \downarrow \downarrow$
# filled pause	$\downarrow \downarrow \downarrow \downarrow \downarrow$
Response latency	$\downarrow \downarrow \downarrow \downarrow \downarrow \downarrow$
Repetition	$\downarrow \downarrow \downarrow \downarrow \downarrow$
False start	$\downarrow\downarrow\downarrow$



### Disfluency

Theory: lie-telling is more cognitively demanding than truth-telling

Features	Trust	Deception
Has filled pause		
# filled pause	$\downarrow \downarrow \downarrow \downarrow \downarrow$	
Response latency	$\downarrow\downarrow\downarrow\downarrow\downarrow$	
Repetition		
False start	$\downarrow \downarrow$	

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## Prosody

HD

**Features** Duration Speaking rate Pitch max Pitch min Intensity max, mean Intensity min Intensity std Jitter, shimmer, nhr

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## Prosody

Features	Trust
Duration	$\downarrow \downarrow \downarrow \downarrow \downarrow$
Speaking rate	$\uparrow \uparrow \uparrow \uparrow$
Pitch max	
Pitch min	$\uparrow \uparrow$
Intensity max,	$\uparrow \uparrow \uparrow \uparrow$
mean	
Intensity min	
Intensity std	$\downarrow \downarrow \downarrow \downarrow \downarrow$
Jitter, shimmer,	$\uparrow \uparrow \uparrow \uparrow$
nhr	



Prosody

Features	Trust	Deception
Duration		$\uparrow \uparrow \uparrow \uparrow$
Speaking rate	$\uparrow \uparrow \uparrow \uparrow$	
Pitch max		
Pitch min	$\uparrow \uparrow$	
Intensity max,	$\uparrow \uparrow \uparrow \uparrow$	
mean		
Intensity min		$\uparrow$
Intensity std		
Jitter, shimmer,	$\uparrow \uparrow \uparrow \uparrow$	
nhr		

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### How to Tell a Believable Lie

Features	Successful Lie
Duration	$\downarrow\downarrow\downarrow\downarrow\downarrow$
Speaking rate	$\uparrow \uparrow \uparrow \uparrow$
Response latency	
Intensity mean	
Repetition	$\downarrow\downarrow\downarrow\downarrow\downarrow$
Filled pauses	$\downarrow \downarrow \downarrow \downarrow \downarrow$



### **Can We Predict Trusted Speech?**

5-fold cross validation, speaker independent Low agreement task -> only classify utterances with consensus Logistic regression Evaluate with macro-F1 Baseline (random): 44.62 F1



### **Can We Predict Trusted Speech?**

#### **NLP Data-driven features**


- GloVe embeddings
- Dependency parse n-grams
- Word n-grams

#### Hypothesized deception/trust features

- Disfluency
- Complexity
- Prosody
- Speaker traits

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### **Can We Predict Trusted Speech?**





### **Summary: Trusted Speech**

Subjective task Characteristics of trust vs. deception Individual differences Trust classification: 66.62 F1 Why people are bad at lie detection:

Mismatch between features of trusted and truthful speech



### Conclusion

We can automatically identify deception using acoustic-prosodic, lexical, personality and demographic features – much better than humans

We can also identify speech that humans trust and mistrust and understand the reasons for the mismatch between perceived deception and actual lies

#### Future research:

- Generating trusted speech automatically
- Developing techniques and software to train humans in identifying lies





## **True or False?**













## **True or False?**












## **True or False?**











## **True or False?**







## **Questions?**